In this paper we present various temporal justification logics involving both past and future time modalities. We combine Artemov's logic of proofs with linear temporal logic (with both past and future operators), and establish its soundness and completeness. Then we investigate several principles describing the interaction of justification and time.
Introduction
Linear temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where the knowledge of an agent is changed over time [8, 15, 16] . The temporal component in such systems is usually interpreted over a discrete linear model of time with finite past and infinite future; in this case (N, <) can be chosen as the flow of time (for a logic of knowledge and branching time see [23] ). And the knowledge component is typically modeled using the modal logic S5.
This paper continues the study of temporal justification logics from [5, 6] . Temporal justification logic is a new family of temporal logics of knowledge in which the knowledge of agents is modeled using a justification logic. Justification logics are modal-like logics that provide a framework for reasoning about epistemic justifications (see [3, 4] for a survey). The language of multi-agent justification logics extends the language of propositional logic by justification terms and expressions of the form [t] i ϕ, with the intended meaning "t is agent i's justification for ϕ." The Logic of Proofs LP was the first logic in the family of justification logics, introduced by Artemov in [1, 2] . The logic of proofs is a justification counterpart of the modal epistemic logic S4.
It is known that linear temporal logic with only future time operators is weak to fully express some properties of systems, such as unique initial states and synchrony (cf. [15, 10] ). Neither of the temporal justification logics of [5] and [6] contains past time operators in their languages. The aim of this paper is to add past time operators to the temporal justification logic of [6] , and to study principles describing the interaction of justifications and time.
In the following, let h be a fixed number of agents, Ag = {1, . . . , h} the set of all agents, Const a countable set of justification constants, Var a countable set of justification variables, and Prop a countable set of atomic propositions.
The set of justification terms Tm is defined inductively by
where c ∈ Const and x ∈ Var.
The set of formulas Fml is inductively defined by
where i ∈ Ag, t ∈ Tm, and P ∈ Prop. The temporal operators , w , U , S are respectively called next (or tomorrow), weak previous (or weak yesterday), until, and since. An until formula is a formula of the form ϕ U ψ for some formulas ϕ and ψ, and a justification assertion is a formula of the form [t] i ϕ for some formula ϕ and term t.
We use the following usual abbreviations:
The temporal operators s , ◻, , ⊟, are respectively called strong previous, always from now on (or henceforth), sometime (or eventuality), has-always-been, and once.
Associativity and precedence of connectives, as well as the corresponding omission of brackets, are handled in the usual manner.
Subformulas are defined as usual. The set of subformulas Sub(χ) of a formula χ is inductively given by:
For a set S of formulas, Sub(S) denotes the set of all subformulas of the formulas from S.
The combined language of justification logic and temporal logic allows for expressing some properties of systems that are not expressible in the known logics of knowledge and time. For example, -"t justifies ϕ for agent i until ψ holds" can be expressed by ([t] i ϕ) U ψ.
-"t justifies ϕ for agent i since ψ holds" can be expressed by ([t] i ϕ) S ψ.
-"t is agent i's conclusive evidence that ϕ is true" can be expressed by ◻ [t] i ϕ or even by ⊟ [t] i ϕ ∧ ◻ [t] i ϕ. -"If agent i knows that ϕ for reason t, then ϕ is always true" can be expressed by [t] i ϕ → ◻ϕ. -"Agent i will have not forgotten her justification t for ϕ by tomorrow, providing she possesses the justification now" can be expressed by [t] i ϕ → [t] i ϕ. -"Agent i will learn that t is a justification for ϕ tomorrow, but she does not know it now" can be expressed by
More connections between justification and time will be explored in Sections 8, 10, and 11.
Axioms
The axiom system for temporal justification logic consists of three parts, namely propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic.
Propositional Logic
For propositional logic, we take 1. all propositional tautologies (Taut)
as axioms and the rule modus ponens, as usual:
Temporal Logic
For the temporal part, we use a system of [11, 13, 14] and [19, 18, 10] with axioms Axioms for the future operators:
Axioms for the past operators:
and rules
Let LTL P denote the axiomatic system given by the above axioms and rules.
Justification Logic
Finally, for the justification logic part, we use a multi-agent version of the Logic of Proofs [2, 7, 12, 24] with axioms
and the iterated axiom necessitation rule
where the constant specification CS is a set of formulas
where n ≥ 1, i 1 , . . . , i n are arbitrary agents, c jn , . . . , c j1 are justification constants, and ϕ is an axiom instance of propositional logic, temporal logic, or justification logic. Moreover, a constant specification CS should be downward closed in the sense that whenever
Remark 3.1. It is perhaps worth noting that the temporal justification logics of [5, 6] are formalized using the following axiom necessitation rule
We prefer (iax-nec) to (ax-nec) because the iterated axiom necessitation rule enables us to prove the internalization property (see Section 9) . All the results of this paper, except the results of Section 9, continue to hold if the logics are formalized by the rule (ax-nec).
For a given constant specification CS, we use LPLTL P CS to denote the Hilbert system given by the axioms and rules for propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic as presented above. We write ⊢ CS ϕ if a formula ϕ is derivable in LPLTL P CS . The definition of derivation from a set of premises is standard. A formula ϕ is derivable from the set of assumptions Γ , written Γ ⊢ CS ϕ, iff ϕ is in Γ , or is one of the axioms of LPLTL P CS , or follows from derivable formulas through applications of the rules (MP), (ax-nec), and necessitation, where necessitation rules can be applied only to derivations without assumptions. In other words:
Note that the Deduction Theorem holds in LPLTL P CS . It is easy to show that:
Temporal justification logic LPLTL of [6] is a fragment of LPLTL P without past operators w and S , and without axioms and rules involving past operators.
The axiomatization for linear time temporal logic given in [11, 13, 14, 17] includes the following axioms
The following lemma shows that we do not need these axioms since in our formalization ◻ and ⊟ are defined operators.
Maximal consistent sets
All the results of this section hold for extensions of LTL P , i.e. LPLTL, LPLTL P , and all extensions introduced in Sections 8, 9, 11 . Let L be an extension of LTL P , and let ⊢ CS denote derivability in L CS , where CS is a constant specification for L.
For a formula χ, let
Definition 4.1. Let CS be a constant specification for L.
Let MCS χ denote the set of all χ-maximally L CS -consistent subsets of Sub + (χ). Note that MCS χ is a finite set.
Let MCS denote the set of all maximally L CS -consistent sets, and for Γ ∈ MCS, let Γ ∶= Γ ∩ Sub + (χ).
Proof. (⊆) Let ∆ ∈ MCS χ . Then ∆ can be extended to a maximal CS-consistent set Γ ∈ MCS. It is easy to show that ∆ = Γ ∩ Sub + (χ), and thus ∆ = Γ .
(⊇) It is sufficient to show that for each Γ ∈ MCS the set Γ is CS-consistent and χ-maximal. The CS-consistency of Γ follows from the CS-consistency of Γ . In order to show the χ-maximality of Γ , suppose towards a contradiction that Γ has a CS-consistent proper extension Σ ⊆ Sub + (χ). Let ϕ ∈ Σ ∖ Γ . Thus ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Since ϕ ∈ Sub + (χ) we can distinguish the following cases:
ϕ ∈ A χ . In this case ¬ϕ ∈ Sub + (χ), and hence ¬ϕ ∈ Γ ⊆ Σ, which contradicts ϕ ∈ Σ. -ϕ = ¬ψ and ψ ∈ A χ . In this case ¬ϕ = ¬¬ψ ∈ Γ , and hence ψ ∈ Γ . Thus
Proof. The proof of all items are standard.
⊓ ⊔
We define the relation R on MCS χ as follows:
From this definition we immediately get the following lemmas.
We first show that Λ is CS-consistent. If Λ is not CS-consistent, then
Hence ∈ Γ . Since ⊢ CS → , we have → ∈ Γ , and hence ∈ Γ which is a contradiction.
Since Λ is CS-consistent, it can be extended to a maximally CS-consistent set ∆ ∈ MCS. It is easy to prove that Γ R ∆ as desired.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4.5. Let Γ , ∆ ∈ MCS χ and Γ R ∆.
Proof. 1. For the if direction, suppose towards a contradiction that ϕ ∈ ∆. Thus ¬ϕ ∈ ∆. Since Γ R ∆, we get ¬ϕ ∈ Γ and hence ¬ ϕ ∈ Γ , which would contradict the assumption ϕ ∈ Γ . The proof of the only if direction follows from the definition of R . 2. If ϕ ∈ Γ , then by the axiom (FP) we get s ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence by item 1 we get s ϕ ∈ ∆. For the converse, suppose that s ϕ ∈ ∆. Then, by the definition of R , s ϕ ∈ Γ . Assume to obtain a contradiction that ϕ ∈ Γ . Then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ , and by the axiom (FP) we get s ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Since ⊢ CS s ¬ϕ → ¬ s ϕ, we arrive at a contradiction ¬ s ϕ ∈ Γ . 3. The if direction is obtained from item 2 and axiom (sw). For the converse suppose w ϕ ∈ ∆. It follows that w ϕ ∈ Γ . Assume to obtain a contradiction that ϕ ∈ Γ . Then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence s ¬ϕ
We first prove that Λ is CS-consistent. If Λ is not CS-consistent, then
for some ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ Γ . Using item 5 of Lemma 3.3, we have
By axiom (PF)
Hence w ∈ Γ . Since w ∈ Sub + (χ), we have w ∈ Γ , contradicting our assumption that Γ is not initial. Since Λ is CS-consistent, it can be extended to a maximally CS-consistent set ∆ ∈ MCS. Clearly, ∆R Γ as desired. Conversely, suppose that there exists ∆ ∈ MCS χ such that ∆R Γ . Suppose towards a contradiction that w ∈ Γ . By item 3 of Lemma 4.5, we get ∈ ∆, which is a contradiction. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4.8. If Γ is initial, then s ϕ ∈ Γ for all formulas ϕ.
Proof. Suppose Γ is initial. Then w ∈ Γ , and then w ∈ Γ . We suppose that s ϕ ∈ Γ for some formula ϕ and derive a contradiction. By item 1 of Lemma 3.3, we have ⊢ CS s ϕ → ¬ w , and hence s ϕ
Therefore,
By Lemma 4.4, there is Π ∈ MCS χ such that ΣR Π. Next we show that Γ = Σ and ∆ = Π, from which it follows that Γ R ∆.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 4.9 and the following fact
Proof. By Lemma 4.9, for all Γ , ∆ ∈ MCS χ we have
Thus
and hence
We also have (cf. [15, Lemma 4.1])
By ( -nec) we get
By item 7 of Lemma 3.3, we get
Hence
Therefore
By (3) we infer
Proof. First note that if Γ is initial, i.e. w ∈ Γ , then by Lemma 4.7 the set Y is empty, and moreover we have
Now suppose Γ is not initial, and thus by Lemma 4.7 there is ∆ 0 ∈ MCS χ such that ∆ 0 R Γ . By Lemma 4.10, for all Γ , ∆ ∈ MCS χ we have
From (4) by ( w -nec) we get
and thus by item 4 of Lemma 3.3 we have
By (5) we infer
and thus by item 3 of Lemma 3.3
Thus, by the axiom (sw), we get
Therefore, by item 2 of Lemma 3.3, we get
. We first show that:
Suppose ψ ∈ Γ . Then the sequence (Γ ) would be a ϕ U ψ-sequence starting with Γ , contradicting our assumption. Thus ψ ∈ Γ , and hence we get ¬ψ ∈ Γ . On the other hand, from ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ it follows that ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ (ϕ U ψ)) ∈ Γ . From this we can immediately deduce by ¬ψ ∈ Γ that ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence ϕ ∈ Γ . Let T U be the smallest set of elements of MCS χ such that
First we show that for all Σ ∈ T U such that Σ ≠ Γ and ϕ ∈ Σ there is ∆ ∈ T U such that ∆R Σ. In order to prove this let
It is enough to show that T = ∅. If T ≠ ∅, then T U ∖ T is a proper subset of T U that satisfies properties 1 and 2. This contradicts the fact that T U is the smallest set with properties 1 and 2. From the definition of T U and (7) it is not difficult to show that ϕ ∈ Σ for all Σ ∈ T U . Thus it follows that for all Σ ∈ T U there are Γ 0 , . . . , Γ n ∈ T U , for n ≥ 0,
Now we claim that for all Σ ∈ T U we have ¬ψ ∈ Σ, and hence ⊢ CS ⋀ Σ → ¬ψ.
In order to prove the claim first note that, by (7),
would be a ϕ U ψ-sequence starting with Γ , contradicting our assumption. Therefore, by item 2 of Lemma 4.3, ¬ψ ∈ Σ. This completes the proof of the claim.
Let
Using the above claim we get ⊢ CS ρ → ¬ψ.
Let ∆ ∈ T U and Σ ∈ MCS χ such that ∆R Σ. We have either ϕ ∈ Σ or ϕ ∈ Σ. If ϕ ∈ Σ, then by property 2 we have Σ ∈ T U , and hence ⊢ CS ⋀ Σ → ρ. If ϕ ∈ Σ, then ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. In addition, ψ ∈ Σ, since otherwise we get a ϕ U ψ-sequence starting with Γ . Thus ¬ψ ∈ Σ, and hence ⊢ CS ⋀ Σ → ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ.
Thus, for each ∆ ∈ T U and each Σ ∈ MCS χ such that ∆R Σ, we have
and hence,
By Lemma 4.11, for each ∆ ∈ T U we have
such that Σ i ∈ MCS χ and ∆R Σ i . By (8), we get Proof. Suppose ϕ S ψ ∈ Γ and there exists no ϕ S ψ-sequence ending with Γ . First note that since ϕ S ψ ∈ Sub + (χ), we have either ϕ, ψ ∈ Sub(χ) or ϕ = ⊺ ∈ A χ and ψ = w ∈ A χ . In either case we have ϕ, ψ, ¬ψ ∈ Sub + (χ). From this, similar to the proof of Lemma 4.14, it is proved that ϕ, ¬ψ ∈ Γ . Let T S be the smallest set of elements of MCS χ such that
Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.14, it is proved that for all ∆ ∈ T S there is n ≥ 0 and Γ 0 , . . . ,
We have ⊢ CS ρ → ¬ψ.
Moreover, for each Σ ∈ T S and each ∆ ∈ MCS χ with ∆R Σ, we have
By Lemma 4.12, for each Σ ∈ T S we have
such that ∆ i ∈ MCS χ and ∆ i R Σ. By (9), we get
Lemma 4.18. Every finite sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) of elements of MCS χ with w ∈ Γ 0 and Γ j R Γ j+1 , for all 0 ≤ j < n, can be extended to an acceptable sequence.
Proof. In order to fulfill the requirements of Definition 4.17, we shall extend the sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) by the following steps.
Suppose ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ 0 and the requirement is not fulfilled for this until formula. Then either ψ ∈ Γ 0 or ¬ψ ∈ Γ 0 . In the former case the requirement is fulfilled for the formula ϕ U ψ in Γ 0 , and we go to the next step. In the latter case, using axiom
We can repeat this argument for Γ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We find that the requirement
In the latter case, by Lemma 4.14, there exists a sequence (
This gives a finite extension of the original sequence that satisfies the requirement imposed by ϕ U ψ ∈ Γ 0 .
In the next step we repeat this argument for the remaining until formulas at Γ 0 . Eventually we obtain a finite sequence that satisfies all requirements imposed by until formulas at Γ 0 .
We may move on to Γ 1 and apply the same procedure. It is clear that by iterating the above argument to all until formulas of all elements Γ i of the sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , . . .), including until formulas of new elements Γ i for i > n, we obtain in the limit a (finite or infinite) sequence that extends (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) and satisfies conditions 1-3 of Definition 4.17. If the resulting sequence if finite, then by seriality of R it can be extended to an infinite sequence, and in each step of this extension we can repeat the above argument to fulfill the obligations arising from the until formulas. Thus, we finally get an acceptable sequence that extends (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ).
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 4.19. For every Γ ∈ MCS χ , there is an acceptable sequence containing Γ . In this section we introduce interpreted systems based on Fitting-models as semantics for temporal justification logic LPLTL P .
S is a non-empty set of states; 2. each R i ⊆ S × S is a reflexive and transitive relation.
A run r on a frame is a function from N to states, i.e., r ∶ N → S. A system R is a non-empty set of runs. Given a run r and n ∈ N, the pair (r, n) is called a point.
satisfying the following conditions. For all terms s, t ∈ Tm, all formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml, and all v, w ∈ S,
3. An interpreted system for CS is a tuple
Definition 5.4. Given an interpreted system
a run r ∈ R, and n ∈ N, we define truth of a formula ϕ in I at point (r, n) inductively by
As usual, we write I ⊧ ϕ if for all r ∈ R and all n ∈ N, we have (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ. Further, we write ⊧ CS ϕ if I ⊧ ϕ for all interpreted systems I for CS. Thus, true m (ϕ) expresses that "ϕ is true at time m."
Remark 5.7. The interpreted systems are originally formulated by means of the notions of local and global states (see e.g. [8, 15] ). Now I aim to define the interpreted systems for LPLTL P , using the notions of local and global states, so that it more closely matches the original definition of interpreted systems given in [8] .
Suppose that at any point in time the system is in some global state, defined by the local states of the agents and the state of other objects of interest (which is refered to as the "environment"). Let L be some set of local states. Informally, an agent's local state captures all the information available to her at a given moment of time. A global state is a (h + 1)-tuple ⟨l e , l 1 , . . . , l h ⟩ ∈ L h+1 , where l e is the state of environment and l i is the local state of agent i for i = 1, . . . , h. Now in order to define the interpreted systems for LPLTL P using the notions of local and global states, it is enough to put the set of states S ∶= L h+1 . As before a run r is a function from time to global states, i.e., r ∶ N → L h+1 , and a system is a set R of runs. The definitions of CS-evidence functions, interpreted systems, and truth are as before.
It is worth noting that the semantics given by Bucheli in [5] for temporal justification logic employs global states. However, there is a minor difference between Bucheli's semantics and ours. Since he modeled the knowledge part of the temporal justification logic by a justification counterpart of the modal logic S5, he defines indistinguishability relations ∼ i between points, for each agent i, which are clearly equivalence relations. In contrast to his formulation, our temporal justification logic is based on a justification counterpart of the modal logic S4, and thus we naturally make use of reflexive and transitive accessibility relations R i for each agent i.
Soundness and Completeness of LPLTL P
The soundness proof for LPLTL P CS is a straightforward combination of the soundness proofs for temporal logic and justification logic by induction on the derivation. 
for CS is defined as follows:
1. R consists of all mappings r ∶ N → MCS χ such that (r(0), r(1), . . .) is an acceptable sequence;
for CS is an interpreted system for CS.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the corresponding proof for single agent Fitting-models in [9] .
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 6.4 (Truth Lemma). Let I = (R, S, R 1 , . . . , R h , E 1 . . . , E h , ν) be the χcanonical interpreted system for CS. For every formula ψ ∈ Sub + (χ), every run r in R, and every n ∈ N we have:
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. Let r(i) = Γ i , for i ≥ 0. We show only the following cases:
, then ϕ ∈ E i (r(n), t). Now suppose that R i (r(n), r ′ (n ′ )) and let r ′ (n ′ ) = ∆ n ′ . We find ϕ ∈ ∆ n ′ . By the induction hypothesis we get (I, r ′ , n ′ ) ⊧ ϕ. Since r ′ and n ′ were arbitrary, we conclude (I, r, n)
(⇒) Suppose that (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ and ϕ ∈ r(n). Then (I, r, n + 1) ⊧ ϕ, and hence by the induction hypothesis ϕ ∈ r(n + 1). On the other hand, ¬ ϕ ∈ r(n). Since r(n)R r(n + 1), by Lemma 4.5, we get ¬ϕ ∈ r(n + 1), which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If ϕ ∈ r(n), then ϕ ∈ r(n+1). By the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n+1) ⊧ ϕ, and hence (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ.
(⇒) If (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 1 U ψ 2 , then (I, r, m) ⊧ ψ 2 for some m ≥ n, and (I, r, k) ⊧ ψ 1 for all k with n ≤ k < m. By the induction hypothesis we get ψ 2 ∈ r(m), and ψ 1 ∈ r(k) for all k with n ≤ k < m. We have to show ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n), which follows by induction on m as follows:
• Base case m = n. Since ψ 2 ∈ r(n) = r(m) and ⊢ CS ψ 2 → (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ), by item 4 of Lemma 4.3, we obtain ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n). • Suppose m > n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n + 1), and hence ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n+1 . Thus (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . Now suppose towards a contradiction that ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . Hence ¬(ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . By axiom ( U 2),
and thus
Thus, ¬ (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n , which is a contradiction. Thus, ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n and hence ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n). (⇐) If ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ r(n), then since (r(n), r(n + 1), . . .) is an acceptable sequence there exists m ≥ n such that ψ 2 ∈ r(m), and ψ 1 ∈ r(k) for all k with n ≤ k < m. By the induction hypothesis we obtain (I, r, m) ⊧ ψ 2 , and (I, r, k) ⊧ ψ 1 for all
(⇒) If (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 , then (I, r, m) ⊧ ψ 2 for some m ≤ n, and (I, r, k) ⊧ ψ 1 for all k with m < k ≤ n. By the induction hypothesis, ψ 2 ∈ r(m), and ψ 1 ∈ r(k) for all k with m < k ≤ n. We want to show that ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ r(n). We prove it by induction on m as follows.
• Base case m = n. Since ψ 2 ∈ r(n) = r(m) and ⊢ CS ψ 2 → (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ), we obtain ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ r(n). • Suppose m < n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ r(n − 1), and hence ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−1 . Thus, by Lemma 4.5, s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . Now suppose towards a contradiction that ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . Hence ¬(ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . By axiom ( S 2),
Thus, ¬ s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n , which is a contradiction. (⇐) If ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ r(n), then ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . Thus either ψ 2 ∈ Γ n or ψ 1 ∧ s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . In the former case, ψ 2 ∈ r(n) and by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 2 , and thus (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 as desired. In the latter case, ψ 1 ∈ r(n) and by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 1 . From s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n , by Lemma 4.5, we have ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−1 . Again from
In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ψ 2 , and thus (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 as desired. In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n−1) ⊧ ψ 1 , and by Lemma 4.5 we have ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−2 . By repeating this argument, we finally get either ψ 2 ∈ Γ 0 or ψ 1 ∧ s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ 0 . By Lemma 4.8 the latter case is impossible. In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, 0) ⊧ ψ 2 , and thus (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 as desired.
(⇒) Suppose that (I, r, n) ⊧ w ϕ and w ϕ ∈ r(n). Then n = 0 or (I, r, n−1) ⊧ ϕ.
• Suppose n = 0. Thus w ϕ ∈ Γ 0 . Since ⊺S w is an axiom, we have ⊺S w ∈ Γ 0 . Thus w ∈ Γ 0 or ⊺ ∧ s (⊺S w ) ∈ Γ 0 . By Lemma 4.8, the latter case is impossible, and thus we get w ∈ Γ 0 . Since ⊢ CS w → w ϕ, we get w ϕ ∈ Γ 0 , which is a contradiction. • Suppose n > 0 and (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ϕ. Hence by the induction hypothesis ϕ ∈ r(n − 1), and thus ϕ ∈ Γ n−1 . Thus, by the axiom (FP), s ϕ ∈ Γ n−1 . Hence, by Lemma 4.5, s ϕ ∈ Γ n . On the other hand, from w ϕ ∈ Γ n and axiom (sw) we get s ϕ ∈ Γ n , which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If w ϕ ∈ r(n), then w ϕ ∈ Γ n . In addition if n > 0, then by Lemma 4.5, we get ϕ ∈ Γ n−1 . By the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ϕ, and hence (I, r, n) ⊧ w ϕ.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 6.5 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ,
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ CS ϕ. Thus, {¬ϕ} is a CS-consistent set. Therefore, there exists Γ ∈ MCS with ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Let Γ = Γ ∩ Sub + (ϕ). By Corollary 4.19, there is an acceptable sequence containing Γ , say (Γ 0 , Γ 1 . . . , Γ n , Γ n+1 , . . .) where n ≥ 0 and Γ n = Γ . In the ϕ-canonical model I for CS define the run r as follows r(i) ∶= Γ i . Since ϕ ∈ Γ n , by the Truth Lemma, (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ. Therefore, ⊧ CS ϕ. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 6.6 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ and finite set of formulas Γ , Γ ⊧ CS ϕ implies Γ ⊢ CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that Γ ⊢ CS ϕ. Thus, ⊢ CS ⋀ Γ → ϕ. By Theorem 6.5, there is an interpreted system I = (R, . . .), r ∈ R, and n ∈ N such that (I, r, n) ⊧ ⋀ Γ and (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ. Therefore, Γ ⊧ CS ϕ. ⊓ ⊔ 7 Another semantics for LPLTL P In this section we present another semantics based on Mkrtychev models [21] for LPLTL P . These models are indeed the interpreted systems with a singleton system of runs. Given an LPLTL P CS -model M = (r, S, E 1 . . . , E h , ν) and n ∈ N, we define truth of a formula ϕ in M at state r(n) inductively by (M, r(n)) ⊧ P iff P ∈ ν(r(n)) ,
We write M ⊧ ϕ if (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ for all n ∈ N. From the above definitions it follows that: . , E h , ν) be the χ-canonical model for CS with respect to an acceptable sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . .). For every formula ψ ∈ Sub + (χ), and every n ∈ N we have:
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. We show only the following cases:
. By (reflexivity), ϕ ∈ Γ n and by the induction hypothesis we get (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ. We conclude (M, r(n))
(⇒) If (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 U ψ 2 , then (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ 2 for some m ≥ n, and (M, r(k)) ⊧ ψ 1 for all k with n ≤ k < m. By the induction hypothesis, ψ 2 ∈ Γ m , and ψ 1 ∈ Γ k for all k with n ≤ k < m. We want to show that ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . We prove it by induction on m as follows.
• Base case m = n. Since ψ 2 ∈ Γ n and ⊢ ψ 2 → (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ), we obtain ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . • Suppose m > n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n+1 , and hence (ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . Now suppose towards a contradiction that ψ 1 U ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . Hence ¬(ψ 1 U ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . By axiom ( U 2),
is an acceptable sequence there exists m ≥ n such that ψ 2 ∈ Γ m , and ψ 1 ∈ Γ k for all k with n ≤ k < m. By the induction hypothesis, (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ 2 , and (M, r(k)) ⊧ ψ 1 for all k with n ≤ k < m. Thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 U ψ 2 .
(⇒) If (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 , then (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ 2 for some m ≤ n, and (M, r(k)) ⊧ ψ 1 for all k with m < k ≤ n. By the induction hypothesis, ψ 2 ∈ Γ m , and ψ 1 ∈ Γ k for all k with m < k ≤ n. We want to show that ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . We prove it by induction on m as follows.
• Base case m = n. Since ψ 2 ∈ Γ n and ⊢ ψ 2 → (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ), we obtain ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . • Suppose m < n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−1 , and hence s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . Now suppose towards a contradiction that ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n . Hence ¬(ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n . We get
In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 2 , and thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 as desired. In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 . From s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n , by Lemma 4.5, we have ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−1 . Again from ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−1 it follows that either ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−1 or ψ 1 ∧ s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ n−1 . In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ψ 2 , and thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 as desired. In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ψ 1 , and by Lemma 4.5 we have ψ 1 S ψ 2 ∈ Γ n−2 . By repeating this argument, we finally get either ψ 2 ∈ Γ 0 or ψ 1 ∧ s (ψ 1 S ψ 2 ) ∈ Γ 0 . By Lemma 4.8 the latter case is impossible. In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(0)) ⊧ ψ 2 , and thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ 1 S ψ 2 as desired.
ψ = w ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that (M, r(n)) ⊧ w ϕ and w ϕ ∈ Γ n . Then n = 0 or (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ.
• Suppose n = 0. Since ⊺S w is an axiom, we have ⊺S w ∈ Γ 0 . Thus w ∈ Γ 0 or ⊺∧ s (⊺S w ) ∈ Γ 0 . Since, by Lemma 4.8, the latter case is impossible, we get w ∈ Γ 0 . Since ⊢ w → w ϕ, we get w ϕ ∈ Γ 0 , which is a contradiction. • Suppose n > 0 and (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ. Hence by the induction hypothesis ϕ ∈ Γ n−1 . Thus, by the axiom (FP), s ϕ ∈ Γ n−1 . Hence, by Lemma 4.5, s ϕ ∈ Γ n . On the other hand, from w ϕ ∈ Γ n and axiom (sw) we get s ϕ ∈ Γ n , which is a contradiction. (⇐) If w ϕ ∈ Γ n and n > 0, then by Lemma 4.5, we get ϕ ∈ Γ n−1 . By the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ, and hence (M, r(n)) ⊧ w ϕ. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 7.8 (Completeness). If M ⊧ ϕ for all LPLTL P CS -models M, then ⊢ CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that LPLTL P CS ⊢ ϕ. Thus, {¬ϕ} is a CS-consistent set. Therefore, there exists Γ ∈ MCS with ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Let Γ = Γ ∩Sub + (ϕ). By Corollary 4.19, there is an acceptable sequence containing Γ , say (Γ 0 , Γ 1 . . . , Γ n , Γ n+1 , . . .) where n ≥ 0 and Γ n = Γ . Construct the ϕ-canonical model M for CS with respect to this acceptable sequence. Since ϕ ∈ Γ n , by the Truth Lemma, (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ. Therefore, M ⊧ ϕ.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 7.9 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ and finite set of formulas Γ ,
Proof. Suppose that Γ ⊢ CS ϕ. Thus, ⊢ CS ⋀ Γ → ϕ. By Theorem 7.8, there is an LPLTL P CS -model M = (r, . . .), and n ∈ N such that (M, r(n)) ⊧ ⋀ Γ and (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ. Therefore, Γ ⊩ CS ϕ.
⊓ ⊔
Connecting principles
In LPLTL P CS , epistemic and temporal properties do not interact. In this section we study some principles that create a connection between justifications and temporal modalities. We assume the language for terms to be augmented in the obvious way.
Principles 1-5 were first proposed by Bucheli in [5] from which the name of the axioms are also taken. 1 A few remarks on these principles are in order:
(generalize) This principle says that if you have a fixed piece of evidence that always supports a proposition, then you have evidence that this proposition is always true. The term operator ⇑ converts permanent evidence for a proposition to evidence for knowing that this proposition is always true. (◻-access) This principle says that if you have evidence that a proposition is always true, then at every point in time you are able to access this information. The term operator ⇓ makes the evidence accessible in every future point in time. This principle is a counterpart of the axiom K i ◻ ϕ → ◻K i ϕ in the logics of knowledge and time, which is valid in the interpreted systems with perfect recall (where an agent retains the knowledge of previous times), but does not characterize it, see [15] . ( -access) This principle is similar to the valid formula ◻ϕ → ϕ augmented by justifications. In fact, if you have evidence that a proposition is always true, then you have evidence that it is true tomorrow, and the term operator ↓ constructs such an evidence.
( -right) This principle says that agents do not forget evidence once they have gathered it and can "take it with them". The term operator ⇛ carries evidence through time. This principle is a counterpart of the axiom K i ϕ → K i ϕ in the logics of knowledge and time, which characterizes the synchronous systems (where each agent always knows the time) with perfect recall, see [15] . ( -left) This principle implies some form of conditional prediction. The term operator ⇚ predicts future evidence for knowledge. This principle is a counterpart of the axiom K i ϕ → K i ϕ in the logics of knowledge and time, which characterizes the synchronous systems with no learning (where an agent's knowledge can not increase over time), see [15] .
The connecting principles involving past operators are the dual of those involving future operators, and thus the meaning of the term operators with subscript P can be guessed straightforwardly.
In the rest of this section let Ax denote an arbitrary set of the above connecting principles, i.e. 
Proof. Construct the following proof in LPLTL P (Ax) ∅ where Ax contains axioms (◻-access) and ( -left). Now suppose (generalize) is not in Ax. The proof of completeness of LPLTL P (Ax) is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.8 by constructing a canonical model. Let M = (r, E 1 , . . . , E h , ν) be the χ-canonical model for CS with respect to an acceptable sequence (Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . .) for LPLTL P (Ax) CS . Truth Lemma can be proved as before. The only new part is to show that M is an LPLTL P (Ax) CS -model. We only check the details for (◻-access) and (⊟-generalize), the case of other principles are straightforward.
Let us show that the χ-canonical model of LPLTL P (Ax), where (◻-access) is in Ax, satisfies the (◻-access) condition of Definition 8.2. Suppose ◻ϕ ∈ E i (r(n), t).
We want to show that ϕ ∈ E i (r(m), ⇓ t) for all m ≥ n. It is enough to show that
Let us now show that the χ-canonical model of LPLTL P (Ax), where (⊟-generalize) is in Ax, satisfies the (⊟-generalize) condition of Definition 8.2. Suppose ϕ ∈ E i (r(m), t) for all m ≤ n, and thus [t] i ϕ ∈ Γ m for all m ≤ n. We want to show that ⊟ϕ ∈ E i (r(n),
We leave the completeness of LPLTL P (Ax), where Ax contains (generalize), as an open problem. In Sections 8.1 and 8.2 we achieve the completeness of LPLTL P (Ax) by changing the justification logic part of LPLTL P .
LPLTL P with indexed application operators
In this section we formalize temporal justification logics with indexed application operators, denoted by LPLTL I . 2 Terms and formulas of temporal justification logics with indexed application operators are constructed by the following mutual grammar:
Axioms and rules of LPLTL I are exactly the same as for LPLTL P , except that axiom (application) is replaced by the following axiom
LPLTL I
CS -models are defined as in Definition 11.1 with the difference that condition (application) of Definition 5.2 is replaced by the following condition:
The notions of LPLTL I CS -validity is defined as usual. The proof of soundness and completeness theorems for annotated justification logics with respect to their models is similar to that of LPLTL P . In order to prove completeness of logics involving axiom (generalize), we need to change the notion of subformula. The following definition is inspired by the work of Marti and Studer [20] .
Definition 8.6. For a formula χ, its set of subformulas Subf(χ) is defined similar to Sub(χ) except on justification assertions which is defined by induction on terms as follows:
Completeness for (generalize)
As before let LPLTL I (Ax) denote the result of adding axioms from Ax to LPLTL I . To keep the notation simple, let L gen denote LPLTL I ({(generalize)}). In this section we aim to prove completeness of L gen .
Let MCS ⇑ χ denote the set of all χ-maximally L CS -consistent subsets of Subf + (χ).
Note that all the results of Section 4 are valid if Sub + (χ) is replaced by Subf + (χ), and ⊢ CS is replaced by ⊢ L gen CS . Since the proofs of the results of Section 4 have been given in details, we only outline the necessary changes here while omitting the proofs. Proof. By induction on the build-up of E Bi i . We distinguish the following cases: 
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. We show only the following case:
(⇐) If [t] i ϕ ∈ Γ n , then (r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ E Bi i . By (reflexivity), we have ϕ ∈ Γ n and by I.H. we get (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ. We conclude (M, r(n)) ⊧ [t] i ϕ.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 8.18 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be a constant specification for L gen . Then we have ⊢ L gen CS ϕ iff M ⊧ ϕ for all L gen CS -models M. We close this section with remarking that it is quit possible to extend this completeness result to extensions of L gen . For example consider the logic LPLTL I (Ax) where Ax = {(generalize), (⊟-generalize)}. In order to prove completeness for LPLTL I (Ax), redefine the operator Φ B i as follows:
The rest of the proof of soundness and completeness is similar to that of L gen . Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ.
In case ϕ is an axiom, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c with
In case ϕ is derived by modus ponens from ψ → ϕ and ψ, then, by the induction hypothesis, there are terms s 1 and s 2 such that [s 1 ] i (ψ → ϕ) and [s 2 ] i ψ are provable. Using (application) and modus ponens, we obtain [s 1 ⋅ s 2 ] i ϕ.
In case ϕ is [c jn ] in . . . [c j1 ] i1 ψ, derived using (iax-nec), since CS is axiomatically appropriate, we can use (iax-nec) again to obtain [c jn+1 ] i ϕ for some justification constant c jn+1 .
⊓ ⊔ Next we shall extend LPLTL P to obtain a justification logic with the internalization property. Although the following two formulas are provable in LPLTL P , see Lemma 3.2, in order to get the internalization property we need to add them as axioms:
Let LPLTL int be the logic LPLTL P extended by the axioms (generalize), (⊟-generalize), (mix1), and (mix2). Theorem 9.4 (Internalization). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for LPLTL int . The system LPLTL int CS enjoys internalization.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ is provable in LPLTL int CS . Let i be an arbitrary agent. We have to show that [t] i ϕ is provable in LPLTL int CS , for some term t. We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ. We only consider the following cases:
In case ϕ is ◻ψ, derived using (◻-nec), then, by the induction hypothesis, there is a term s such that [s] i ψ is provable. Now, we can use (◻-nec) in order to obtain ◻ [s] i ψ and then (generalize) and modus ponens to get [⇑ s] i ◻ ψ.
In case ϕ is ψ, derived using ( -nec), then, as above, we obtain [⇑ s] i ◻ ψ. Since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c with [c] i (◻ψ → ψ). Thus we finally conclude [c ⋅ ⇑ s] i ψ.
In case ϕ is ⊟ψ, derived using (⊟-nec), then, by the induction hypothesis, there is a term s such that [s] i ψ is provable. Now, we can use (⊟-nec) in order to obtain ⊟ [s] i ψ and then (⊟-generalize) and modus ponens to get [⇑ P s] i ⊟ ψ.
In case ϕ is w ψ, derived using ( w -nec), then, as above, we obtain [⇑ P s] i ⊟ ψ. Since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c with [c] i (⊟ψ → w ψ). Thus we finally conclude [c ⋅ ⇑ P s] i w ψ. ⊓ ⊔ Remark 9.5. It is worth noting that there are already some known temporal justification logics that satisfy internalization, although they are formalized using only future operators. Bucheli in [5] show that, for axiomatically appropriate constant specifications, the logics LPLTL+(generalize)+( -access) and LPLTL+(generalize)+ (◻-access) + ( -left) satisfy internalization. 4 In [6] the authors introduced another extension of LPLTL, which was called LPLTL ⋆ there, that satisfies internalization.
Theorem 9.6 (Internalization). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for LPLTL P (Ax) where {(generalize), (⊟-generalize), ( -access), ( w -access)} ⊆ Ax.
Then LPLTL P (Ax) CS enjoys internalization.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 9.4. We only consider the following cases: In case ϕ is ψ, derived using ( -nec), then, as in the proof of Theorem 9.4, we obtain [⇑ s] i ◻ ψ. Then, by ( -access), we get [↓⇑ s] i ψ.
In case ϕ is w ψ, derived using ( w -nec), then, as in the proof of Theorem 9.4, we obtain [⇑ P s] i ⊟ ψ. Then, by ( w -access), we get [↓ P ⇑ P s] i w ψ.
⊓ ⊔ In Theorems 9.4 and 9.6 we present two logics that satisfy internalization. We now prove that these two logics have the following relationship. Lemma 9.7. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for LPLTL int . For every agent i, formula ϕ and term t there are terms s 1 (t) and s 2 (t) such that
Thus, versions of ( -access) and ( w -access) are derivable in LPLTL int .
Proof. Since CS is axiomatically appropriate and (mix1) and (mix2) are axioms of LPLTL int , there are justification constants a and b such that [a] i (◻ϕ → ϕ) ∈ CS and [b] i (⊟ϕ → w ϕ) ∈ CS. Thus Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for L. Then L CS enjoys internalization and is sound and complete with respect to L CS -models.
No forgetting and no learning
Perfect recall (or no forgetting) and no learning are two well known properties of systems that can be expressed in the language of logics of knowledge and time. It is known that the following principles would characterize systems with perfect recall (pr) and no learning (nl) respectively (cf. [8, 15] ):
The following could be considered as justification counterparts of (pr) and (nl) respectively
where pr and nl are two binary term operators. Suppose we denote the result of adding (jpr) and (jnl) to LPLTL P by L for now. Given a constant specification CS for L, an L CS -model is defined in the same manner as LPLTL P -models (see Definition 7.1) with the following additional conditions on evidence functions:
-If there is some m with n ≥ m ≥ 0 such that ψ ∈ E i (r(n−m), s) and for all k with 0 ≤ k < m we have ϕ ∈ E i (r(n − k), t), then [t] i ϕ S [s] i ψ ∈ E i (r(n), pr(t, s)). -If there is some m ≥ 0 such that ψ ∈ E i (r(n + m), s) and ϕ ∈ E i (r(n + k), t) for all k with 0 ≤ k < m, then [t] i ϕ U [s] i ψ ∈ E i (r(n), nl(t, s)).
Soundness and completeness of L is proved similar to that of LPLTL P .
Theorem 10.1 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be a constant specification for L. Then ⊢ L CS ϕ iff M ⊧ ϕ for all L CS -models M.
